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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical literature offers contrasting results on the relationship between bank 
competition and financial stability. Yet these results arise from models with three important 
limitations: they are partial equilibrium set-ups; there is no special role for banks as 
institutions endowed with some comparative advantage in screening and/or monitoring 
borrowers; and bank risk is not determined jointly by the borrower and the bank. This paper 
contributes to overcome these limitations. A more general assessment of the relationship 
between bank competition, financial stability and welfare is not only important per se, but it 
is also essential to evaluate whether “granting” banks the ability of earning rents may reduce 
their risk-taking incentives.  
 
We study the relationship between bank competition, financial stability and welfare in 
versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard, where the choice of 
“systematic” risk by either banks or firms is unobservable. In our set-up, risk-neutral agents 
specialize in production at the start date, choosing to become entrepreneurs, bankers, or 
depositors, and at a later date they make their financing and investment decisions. In this 
risk-neutral world, the welfare criterion is total surplus, defined as total output net of effort 
costs. We consider two versions of the model. In the first version, called “basic”, the bank is 
a coalition of entrepreneurs that are financed by depositors. In the second version, called 
“extended”, the “firm” is a coalition of entrepreneurs that is financed by the “bank”, which is 
a coalition of bankers financed by depositors. The firm, the bank and depositors can be also 
viewed as representing the business sector, the banking sector and the household sector.  
 
In both versions, we consider two specifications of the bank’s screening and/or monitoring 
technology, called the “intermediation technology”. In the first specification, the 
intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale: the effort cost of screening 
and/or monitoring is proportional to the size of investment. In the second specification, this 
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale: the effort cost of screening and/or monitoring 
is independent of investment size. This second specification captures in a simple form the 
essential role of banks in economizing on monitoring and screening costs identified by a 
well-known literature briefly reviewed below. 
 
In the basic model the bank chooses (systematic) risk, this choice is unobservable to 
outsiders, and there is competition in the deposit market only, indexed by the opportunity 
costs of depositors to invest in the bank. The results of this model differ strikingly depending 
on whether the intermediation technology exhibits constant or increasing returns to scale. 
Under constant returns to scale, as competition in the deposit market increases, bank risk 
increases, bank capital declines, and welfare is maximized for some intermediate degree of 
competition. Thus, perfect deposit market competition is sub-optimal, as it entails excessive 
bank risk-taking and sub-optimally low levels of bank capitalization. However, allocating 
large shares of surplus (or rents) to banks is not optimal either, as it results in sub-optimally 
low levels of bank-risk taking and excessive bank capitalization.  
 
When the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, however, results are 
totally reversed: as competition increases, bank risk declines, capitalization increases, perfect 
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deposit market competition is optimal, and the lowest feasible level of bank risk is best. This 
reversal is simply explained as follows. As competition increases, a ceteris paribus increase 
in the cost of funding induces the bank to take on more risk. But at the same time the increase 
in the supply of funds to the bank reduces the costs of the intermediation technology owing 
to increasing returns to scale: this offsets the negative impact of higher funding costs on 
bank’s expected profits, inducing the bank to take on less risk. This result is remarkable for 
two reasons: it is obtained under a standard assumption about the bank’s intermediation 
technology, and without modeling loan market competition. Thus, introducing loan market 
competition, as in Boyd and De Nicolo’ (2005), is not necessary—albeit it may be 
sufficient—to yield a positive relationship between bank competition and financial stability.    
 
The extended model depicts the more realistic case in which there is competition in both 
lending and deposit markets, bank risk is jointly determined by borrowers and banks, and 
setting up the intermediation technology entails set-up costs. Here, bank competition is 
indexed by the opportunity costs of depositors to invest in the bank, and the opportunity costs 
of the firm to be financed by the bank. In this model, the relationship between bank 
competition, financial stability, and welfare becomes complex in a substantial economic 
sense, since double-sided competition determines how total surplus, whose size is 
endogenous, is shared by three sets of agents, rather than two, as in the basic model. When 
the degree of competition in lending and deposit markets differs, we illustrate several results 
suggestive of a rich comparative statics, which in some cases overturn simple conjectures on 
the relationship between bank risk, firm risk and capital.  
 
Focusing on changes of competition in both loan and deposit markets, we obtain the 
following main results. If the bank intermediation technology is relatively inefficient, as 
defined as one that entails high monitoring and screening costs but relatively low set-up 
costs, then a level of competition lower than perfect competition is optimal, corresponding to 
an “intermediate” optimal levels of bank risk. However, if the bank intermediation 
technology is relatively efficient, defined as one that entails low monitoring and screening 
costs but relatively large set-up costs, then perfect competition is optimal, and the optimal 
level of bank risk turns out to be the lowest attainable. Notably, these results are independent 
of whether the intermediation technology exhibits constant or increasing returns to scale in 
screening and/or monitoring effort.  
 
We discuss below the empirical relevance of some of our results. Furthermore, we believe 
these results throw a new light on the important policy question regarding the desirability of 
supporting bank profits, or banks’ “charter value”, with some “rents” in order to guarantee 
financial stability: what seems to matter are not necessarily rents per se, but what are their 
sources and how banks might exploit them.  
The remainder of the paper is composed of five sections. Section II presents a brief literature 
review, pointing out the innovations introduced in our model. Section III describes the basic 
version of the model, and section IV derives the relevant comparative statics results. 
Section IV describes the extended model with firms, banks and depositors, and section V 
derives the main comparative statics results. Section VI concludes discussing the empirical 
relevance of our results and their importance for policy. Proofs of all propositions are in the 
Appendix. 
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II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
As pointed out by Allen and Gale (2004a), the relationship between bank competition and 
financial stability has been primarily analyzed in the context of partial equilibrium modeling. 
Few general equilibrium models exist.  Allen and Gale (2004b) consider a general 
equilibrium version of a Diamond and Dybvig (1983)-type economy, and demonstrate that 
perfect competition among intermediaries is Pareto optimal under complete markets, and 
constrained Pareto optimal under incomplete markets, with financial ”instability” as a 
necessary condition of optimality. Analogous results are obtained under low inflation in the 
general equilibrium monetary economy with aggregate liquidity risk analyzed by Boyd, De 
Nicolò and Smith (2004).  However, these general equilibrium models do not feature moral 
hazard due to unobservable risk choices of banks and firms, as we do.  
 
In partial equilibrium, the trade-off between competition and financial stability is typically 
derived through a standard risk shifting argument applied to a bank that raises funds from 
insured depositors and chooses the risk of its investment. Under limited liability, 
unobservable risk choices, risk-insensitive deposit demand, and constant return to scale in 
screening and monitoring, an increase in deposit market competition raises the deposit rate, 
reduces banks’ expected profits and prompts banks to take on more risk. This implication has 
been illustrated by Allen and Gale (2000) in both static and simple dynamic settings, and it is 
the key thrust of work by Keeley (1990), Matutes and Vives (1996), Hellmann, Murdock and 
Stiglitz (2000), Cordella and Levi-Yeyati (2002), Repullo (2004), among many others. 
 
 However, when banks compete in both loan and deposit markets, the loan rate determines 
the level of risk-shifting undertaken by firms, as noted in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Boyd 
and De Nicolò (2005) showed that the trade-off between competition and financial stability 
can vanish when firms’ risk choices are taken into account. An increase in loan market 
competition reduces bank loan rates, increasing firms’ expected profits, inducing firms to 
choose safer investments, which translate into safer bank loan portfolios. In this more 
complex setting, the risk-shifting argument is applied to two entities, firms and banks, rather 
than one. Recent extensions of this type of model, including bank heterogeneity (De Nicolò 
and Loukoianova, 2007), the introduction of different assets (Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal, 
2009), or a different risk structure (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010), have all aimed at 
establishing under what conditions the presence of two risk-shifting effects generates a trade-
off between bank competition and financial stability.   
 
Yet, all papers just mentioned display two features: bank screening and monitoring 
technologies exhibit constant return scale2, and bank risk is not determined jointly by banks 
and borrowers. The constant returns to scale assumption contrasts with a large literature—
including Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Willliamson (1986), Krasa and 
Villamil (1992), and Cerasi and Daltung (2000)—that has identified economies of scale in 
                                                 
2 The constant returns to scale assumption is also adopted in many other papers that do not focus on bank 
competition, such as Besanko and Kanatas (1993); Boot and Greenbaum (1993); Boot and Thakor (2000); 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), and Allen et al. (2011). 
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screening and monitoring as an essential feature of intermediation.3 This motivates our 
analysis of the models under both constant and increasing returns to scale in the 
intermediation technology. In addition, in these models there is either no distinction between 
banks’ and borrowers’ actions, so that risk is determined exclusively by the bank, or 
borrowers choose risk directly while banks choose risk only indirectly through their setting 
of loan rates. Differing from these models, bank risk is jointly determined by the bank and 
the borrower in our extended model.  
 
Furthermore, as noted by Gale (2010), most partial equilibrium models assume that the 
supply of bank capital is perfectly elastic at a given exogenous rate and deliver contrasting 
results regarding the relationship between capital and bank risk-taking. Building on our 
previous work (De Nicolò and Lucchetta, 2009), in this study we introduce bank and firm 
capital in a simple way to capture bank and firm incentives to choose the entity of investment 
of internally generated funds jointly with their risk-taking decisions.  
 
Lastly, most partial equilibrium models just reviewed assume the existence of deposit 
insurance. This assumption is necessary for the standard risk-shifting argument to hold, but 
non-existence of equilibria or multiple equilibria may arise when deposit insurance is fairly 
priced.4 For this reason, and the fact that there is no rationale for deposit insurance in our risk 
neutral world, we do not assume deposit insurance.  
 
III.   THE BASIC MODEL 
There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2, and a continuum of agents on[0,1]  indexed by [0,1]q . 
Agents are risk neutral, have preferences over final date consumption, are endowed with 
effort (labor) at any date, and derive disutility from effort.  
 
At date 0 agents choose to become either investors or entrepreneurs. If an agent chooses to 
become an investor, he/she uses effort at date 0 to obtain qW  units of an intermediate good 
at date 1. This good can be reinvested at date 1 to obtain the date 2 consumption good in two 
alternative ways. It can be invested in an “autarkic technology” which yields an exogenously 
given return   per unit invested, or can be lent to entrepreneurs in exchange of promises to 
deliver date 2 consumption goods. The return of the “autarkic technology” is interpreted as 
the opportunity cost of investing in the bank.5  If an agent chooses to become an 
entrepreneur, he/she forgoes the opportunity to produce the date 1 intermediate good qW , 
which is the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur.  
                                                 
3 For surveys of this literature, see Gorton and Winton (2003) and Freixas and Rochet (2008).  
4 Examples of non-existence and multiplicity of equilibria under fairly priced deposit insurance are shown in 
Boyd and De Nicolò (2003) in a model by Allen and Gale (2000) with deposit market competition. In addition, 
standard implications of partial equilibrium modeling concerning the risk effects of deposit insurance may not 
necessarily hold in general equilibrium, as shown in Boyd, Chang and Smith (2002).  
5 Equivalently, this return may be associated with switching costs incurred by depositors. On switching costs, 
see Klemperer (1995), and for a recent application to banking, see Park and Pennacchi (2009). 
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Thus, at the initial date, agents with a smaller “labor” productivity (indexed by a lower 
[0,1]q ) have a comparative advantage in becoming entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, there 
will be a cutoff level  *q  such that agents with *q q choose to become entrepreneurs, while 
those with *q q choose to become investors. 
  
A.   The Bank 
Entrepreneurs form a coalition called the bank. The bank collects funds from investors, 
called depositors, and distributes its profits to its members in equal shares. The bank has the 
ability to operate a risky project, an intermediation technology, and a capital technology.  
 
The risky project is indexed by the probability of success [0,1]P . Using as input date 1 
intermediate goods, the project yields date 2 consumption goods. A one unit investment in a 
risky project yields X W  with probability P , and 0 otherwise.   
 
The ability of the bank to choose P  is interpreted as representing an intermediation 
technology. In transforming effort into a probability of project success, this technology can 
be viewed as embedding projects’ screening and/or monitoring. Similarly to all papers we 
have reviewed, we assume that the bank does not incur any cost in setting up this technology. 
However, we consider two specifications. In the first specification, this technology exhibits 
constant returns to scale (CR), as the effort cost to implement P  is linearly related to total 
investment in the bank, denoted by Z . In the second specification, the technology exhibits 
increasing returns to scale (IR), as the effort cost to implement P  does not depend on Z . 
The relevant cost functions are:  
2( )
2
C P P Z   (CR), 
                                             2( )
2
C P P       (IR). 
The bank has also access to a capital technology that transforms date 1 entrepreneurs’ 
collective effort and investment Z  into an intermediate good that can be invested in the risky 
technology. Namely, by choice of 0k  , the bank generates total “capital” kZ  at an effort 
cost  2
2
k Z . The bank capital ratio is 1(1 )K k k   . Note that bank capital is endogenous: it 
depends on agents’ specialization choices through the endogenously determined amount of 
funds banks receive, as well as on the bank’s choice of risk. The cost 2
2
k Z  can be viewed 
as capturing in reduced form either a supply of capital that is not infinitely elastic due to 
limited resources, or the costs associated with the generation of internal funding.6  
 
                                                 
6 This feature of our model is novel relative to many set-ups where the levels of internal funding by either firms 
or intermediaries are exogenously given (see e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) or Boot and Thakor (1997)).  
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B.   Contracts, Information and Competition 
Depositors finance the bank with simple debt contracts that pay a fixed amount R  per unit 
invested if the outcome of the investment is positive, and 0 otherwise.  Moral hazard is 
introduced by assuming that the bank choices of P  and  k  are not observable by depositors. 
However, depositors take bank’s optimal choices of P  and  k  into account in their decision 
to accept the deposit terms offered by the bank.  
 
The degree of competition in the deposit market is indexed by depositors’ opportunity costs 
of investing in the bank, which is given by the return of the “autarkic 
technology” max[0, ]   described previously. A higher opportunity costs will force the 
bank to raise the remuneration of deposits to ensure investors will become depositors. Thus, 
the degree of competition in the deposit market varies positively with  . The 
term max denotes the “maximal” level of deposit market competition (or “perfect” deposit 
market competition) which we derive below. In considering the bank as a coalition of all 
entrepreneurs, we focus on how total surplus is distributed between the banking sector and 
depositors, rather than on how surplus is distributed within the banking sector.  Table 1 
summarizes the sequence of events in the basic model.   
 
 
Table 1.  Sequence of Events in the Basic Model 
Time Agents’ decisions Variables determined 
 
t=0 Agents choose to become 
entrepreneurs or investors  
Entrepreneurs form a 
coalition called the bank 
*q : measure (fraction) of 
entrepreneurs 
t=1 Debt contract terms between 
the bank and depositors are 
determined.  
Depositors deliver funds to 
the bank  
The bank chooses the 
riskiness of projects and 
capital. 
 
 
R , Z  
 
P , k  
 
t=2 Project’s output is realized 
and agents’ consumption 
follows. 
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IV.   EQUILIBRIUM IN THE BASIC MODEL 
Equilibrium and the associated welfare metrics are defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1 (Equilibrium).  Given max[0, ]  , an equilibrium is a level of bank risk 
* (0,1]P  , a capitalization rate *k , a deposit rate *R , total investment *Z , and a cut-off level 
*q  such that: 
1. Date 1 
 
Given Z  and q , *R *P , *k  maximize the profits of the bank: 
 2( , , , ) [ ( ) ] ( )
2
B P k R Z P X R Xk k Z C P              (1) 
subject to  
                                                                      *P R          (2)         
      *Z  satisfies: 
                                                
*
1
* *2(1 )
2q
WZ W qdq q        (3)    
2. Date 0   
 
      *q satisfies: 
 
* * * *
* * *
*
( , , , )B P k R Z P R q W
q
    (4)    
 
As of the end of date 1, the bank maximizes expected profits (Equation (1)) by choice of P , 
k . Given these choices, R  is determined subject to depositors’ participation constraint 
(Equation (2)). Equation (3) is the equilibrium condition in the deposit market: bank’s 
demand for funds equals total funds supplied by depositors. Equation (4) determines the 
equilibrium “specialization” choices of agents: *q  is the agent who is indifferent between 
becoming entrepreneur or depositor. Hence, the fraction of agents becoming entrepreneurs 
(depositors) is *q  ( *1 q ).  
 
As all agents are risk neutral, the welfare metric of an equilibrium indexed by   is total 
surplus, defined as expected total output net of effort costs. Total output in the successful 
state is * *(1 )X k Z , bank’s effort in the choice of project risk is *( )C P , and the total cost of 
capital is given by 
*2
2
k .  Hence, we can state the following   
 
Definition 2 (Surplus)  Given max[0, ]   , expected total output net of effort costs is: 
 
*2
* * * *( ) (1 ) ( )
2
kY P X k Z C P                  (5)   
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Solving backward, the characterization of the equilibrium values of bank risk, capitalization 
and the deposit rate is summarized by the following  
 
Proposition 1  
a) Under  (CR),  
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X RP
X


      
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X R Xk
X

 
  ;  
2
*
2
4 ( )( ) (1 1 )
2
X XR
X
  
     if * 1P  ,  *R     if * 1P    
 
b) Under (IR), 
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X R ZP
X Z


   ) ,  
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X R Z Xk
X Z

 
  . 
 
2
*
2
4 ( / )( , ) (1 1 )
2
X Z XR Z
X
  
    if * 1P  ,  *R     if * 1P     
 
We illustrate the results of Proposition 1 focusing on the case in which it is too costly to 
implement * 1P  . To this end, we assume 2X W   and 20 1XWX W

   throughout. 
These assumptions, which are satisfied for a wide range of parameters, are sufficient to 
guarantee that * (0,1)P   for all max[0, ]  .  
 
Under (CR), as the deposit rate increases, bank risk increases ( *P  declines) and capitalization 
declines.  For a given level of Z , the same results hold under (IR). Turning to the deposit 
rate, observe that depositors’ expected return * *P R  equals  , since depositors’ participation 
constraint (2) is satisfied at equality. Under both (CR) and (IR), * *P R  is a strictly concave 
function of *R , which is maximized at max
2
XR  . This rate corresponds to the value max  
which makes the determinant associated with the quadratic equations defined by constraint 
(2) satisfied at equality. Thus, under (CR), and under (IR) for a given level of Z , the deposit 
rate *R  is increasing in  . The equilibrium corresponding to the maximization of 
depositors’ expected returns ( max  ) denotes the “maximal”, or “perfect”, competition in 
the deposit market, while a value of   close to 0 is associated with “minimal” competition in 
the deposit markets, as almost the entire surplus is appropriated by the bank.  Higher values 
of max(0, ]   index increasing deposit market competition.  
 
Proposition 1 illustrates the key difference between the (CR) and the (IR) cases. Under (CR), 
bank risk, capitalization and the deposit rate are independent of the total amount of funding 
Z , while under (IR) they do depend on Z .  
 
We close the model by establishing existence of equilibriums. 
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Proposition 2   Under both (CR) and (IR), an equilibrium exists for all max(0, ]  . The 
equilibrium functions * * * * *{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}P k R Z q     are continuous and differentiable 
on max(0, ]  . 
 
The complete comparative statics of the model is summarized by the following: 
 
Proposition 3.    
a) Under (CR),  * *0; 0P k   ; * 0q  and * 0Z  . 
b) Under( IR),  * *0; 0P k   ; * 0q  and * 0Z  . 
 
Under (CR), as deposit market competition increases (   raises), bank risk increases and 
capital declines. Moreover, a larger fraction of agents become depositors ( *q  declines) and, 
as a result, the total amount of funds available to the bank *Z  increases.  Under (IR), as   
raises, *q  declines and *Z  increases, as in the (CR) case. However, the results on risk and 
capital are reversed. As the deposit rate *R  increases, bank profits decline, ceteris paribus. 
However, in this case bank expected profits will on net increase, since the increase in Z  
offsets the decline in profits due to the higher cost of funds, owing to the increasing returns 
of the intermediation technology. Therefore, the bank will have an incentive to take on less 
risk (a higher *P ) and increase capitalization ((a higher *k ).7 In sum, under (IR), the 
comparative statics of bank risk and capital is exactly the opposite of the (CR) case 
 
The following proposition illustrates how these radically different implications translate into 
the welfare properties of the equilibriums.    
 
Proposition 4.   
 
a) Under (CR), there exists a value maxˆ (0, )  such that ˆ( ) ( )Y Y   for all 
max[0, ]  . 
b) Under (IR), max( ) ( )Y Y   for all max(0, ]  . 
 
                                                 
7 We can relax the parametric assumptions sufficient to guarantee * 1P   for all max(0, ]  with no 
change in the qualitative results. Under (CR), since *P  is strictly decreasing in  , there can exist a range 
ˆ[0, ] with maxˆ  such that * 1P  , and * 1P   for all maxˆ[ , ]   . In this case Proposition 3(a) 
would hold with * 0P   for all ˆ[0, ]  , and * 0P   for all maxˆ[ , ]   . Under (IR), since *P  is 
strictly increasing in  , there can exist a range  ˆ[0, ] with maxˆ  such that * 1P  , and * 1P   for all 
maxˆ[ , ]   . In this case Proposition 3(b) would hold with * 0P   for all ˆ[0, ]  , and * 0P   for all 
maxˆ[ , ]   .   
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Proposition 4 says that under (CR) a certain level of “imperfect” deposit market competition 
is optimal, while under (IR), perfect deposit market competition is optimal. These results can 
be simply explained as follows. Under (CR), the derivative of ( )Y  with respect to the 
competition parameter  can be written as: 
 * ** * * 2 *2 * * 2 *
1 1[ ( ) ( ) ]
2R R
Y R Z P X X P Z P X X P    
                (6) 
 
The first term of (6) is positive, while the second term is negative. When *Z is not too large, 
the first term dominates the second, as the marginal increase in expected output is larger than 
the marginal increase in the cost of the intermediation technology. However, when *Z  
becomes sufficiently large, the second term dominates the first, since the increase in the cost 
of the intermediation technology becomes larger, being proportional to a higher level of 
investment *Z . By contrast—as shown in the Appendix—under (IR) the derivative of 
( )Y  with respect to the competition parameter  can be written as:  
*2
* * * 2( ) ( )
2
PY Z P X Z X         (7) 
Both terms of (7) are positive. Since *Z  and *P  are strictly increasing in the competition 
parameter  , ( )Y   is strictly increasing in  . This happens because the cost of the 
intermediation technology per unit of investment declines owing to increasing returns to 
scale. 
 
Summing up, the optimal level of deposit market competition is imperfect competition under 
(CR), with the optimal level of bank risk between the highest and lowest feasible levels. 
Under (IR), perfect deposit market competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible 
level of bank risk.   
 
V.   THE EXTENDED MODEL   
The basic model is extended by assuming that there are two sets of a continuum of agents on 
[0,1] , set F and set B, both indexed by [0,1]q , endowed with labor (effort) at any date. As 
before, agents are risk neutral, have preferences over date 2 consumption only, and derive 
disutility from effort.  
 
At date 0, an agent in set F chooses to become either an investor or an entrepreneur, while an 
agent in set B chooses to become either an investor or a banker. An agent q in both sets F and 
B who decides to become an investor uses effort at date 0 to obtain qW  units of an 
intermediate good at date 1, which can be reinvested at date 1 either in an “autarkic 
technology” which yields a return 0D   at date 2, or can be lent to the bank. 
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A.   The Firm 
Agents in set F who have chosen to become entrepreneurs can become successful 
entrepreneurs with probability (0,1)BP  , or unsuccessful otherwise, with this event being 
realized at date 1. Agents who turn out unsuccessful entrepreneurs cannot operate any 
project, and employ effort to produce a given amount of the date 2 consumption good 
standardized to zero. Thus, differing from the previous set-up, becoming a successful 
entrepreneur is risky. We assume that successful entrepreneurs can be identified by all 
agents.  
 
Successful entrepreneurs form a coalition called the firm. The firm has access to two 
mutually exclusive investment opportunities. It can operate risky projects indexed by the 
probability of success [0,1]FP  , whose returns are identical to the ones defined previously, 
the choice of this investment is observable, but the realization of the outcome can be 
observed only by the bank. This assumption prevents the firm to be financed directly by 
investors when it chooses to operate risky projects.  
 
The firm employs a managerial technology to choose FP , which transforms effort into a 
probability of project success. The effort cost function to implement FP  exhibits constant 
returns to scale, as the effort cost of choosing FP  is linearly related to the external funding 
obtained at date 1, denoted by FZ :  
2( )
2
F F F FC P P Z   (M) 
The firm has also access to a capital technology that transforms date 1 efforts and external 
funding into the date 1 intermediate good of the type already described in the context of the 
base model.  By choice of 0Fk  , the firm generates total “capital” F Fk Z  at an effort cost  
2
2
F Fk Z .  
 
The second investment opportunity available to the firm is a risk-free technology that 
transforms any date 1 financing obtained into date 2 consumption goods with return 
F D   for all ( , )F D  . Thus, the firm can raise funds directly from investors 
remunerating them their opportunity cost D , thus obtaining a return F D   per unit 
invested.  The rate F  indexes the degree of loan market competition, since its level limits 
the capacity of the bank to extract surplus from the firm. 
 
B.   The Bank 
Similarly to the previous set-up, agents in set B who have chosen to be bankers form a 
coalition called the bank, whose proceeds are distributed to members in equal shares.  
Becoming a bank entails access to an intermediation technology, which is set up and 
implemented at the initial date, as well as a capital technology used at date 1. 
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At date 0 the bank selects the probability of entrepreneurs’ success BP  employing effort, 
which can be interpreted as an information production technology embedding projects’ 
screening. Differing from the basic model, however, the bank incurs a fixed (effort) cost B  
to set up this intermediation technology, Let BZ denote a bank’s external funding.  As before, 
we assume that the effort cost function to implement BP  is either constant returns to scale 
(CR) or increasing returns to scale (IR): 
2( )
2
B B B BC P P Z          (CR)      
2( )
2
B B BC P P          (IR)      
Once the random variable “success” for entrepreneurs has been realized, the bank finances 
the risky projects of the firm, i.e. the coalition of successful entrepreneurs. Note that bank 
risk is different from firm risk ( FP ). For simplicity, we assume that the probabilities of being 
a successful entrepreneur, and that of a successful realization of the technology selected by 
the firm, are independent. Therefore, bank risk, given by B FP P  , is determined jointly by 
the firm through its managerial technology, and by the bank through its intermediation 
technology.   
 
Finally, as in the previous set-up, for any given external funding BZ obtained at date 1, the 
bank has access to a capital technology identical to that described previously: by choice of 
0Bk  , a bank generates total capital B Bk Z  at an effort cost  2
2
B Bk Z .   
 
C.   Contracts, Information and Competition 
Depositors finance banks, and banks finance firms with simple debt contracts  Firm and bank 
moral hazard is introduced by assuming that the choices of ( , )F FP k  and ( , )B BP k  are not 
observed by outsiders. However, outsiders (depositors vs. the bank, and the bank vs. the 
firm) take the optimal choices of the bank and the firm into account in their decisions. 
Competition in the loan market is indexed by the opportunity cost of successful firms not to 
invest in the risk-free technology financed by borrowing directly from investors, which 
yields F D  . Competition in the deposit market is indexed by the opportunity costs for 
depositors to give up investing in their “autarkic technology” obtaining D  per unit invested.  
The sequence of events in the extended model is summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 2.   Sequence of Events in the Extended Model 
 
Time Agents’ decisions Variables determined 
 
t=0 Agents choose to become 
entrepreneurs, bankers or 
investors/depositors  
 
Bankers form a coalition 
called the bank 
The bank chooses the 
probability of success for 
entrepreneurs 
Fq : measure of entrepreneurs 
Bq : measure of bankers 
2 F Bq q  : measure of 
depositors 
 
 
BP  
t=1 The event “entrepreneur 
success” is realized. 
Successful entrepreneurs 
form a coalition called the 
firm, which contracts with 
the bank 
 
The terms of deposit and 
lending contracts among the 
firm, the bank and depositors 
are determined. 
Depositors deliver funds to 
banks 
Banks choose capital and 
deliver funds to firms  
Firms choose the riskiness of 
projects and capital 
 
 
 
 
 
DR , LR  
 
BZ  
Bk , FZ  
FP , Fk  
 
t=2 Project’s output is realized 
and agents’ consumption 
follows. 
 
 
 
 
VI.   EQUILIBRIUMS IN THE EXTENDED MODEL 
The equilibrium in the extended model is defined as follows. 
 
Definition 3 (Equilibrium).  Given competition parameters ( , ) 0F D    , an equilibrium is 
a set of non-negative vectors of firm’s choices of risk and capitalization * *( , )F FP k , of bank’s 
choices of capitalization, loan and deposit rates and bank portfolio risk * * * *( , , , )B L D Bk R R P , 
firm’s and bank’s investment * *( , )F BZ Z , and fractions of entrepreneurs and bankers * *( , )F Bq q  
that satisfy: 
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1. Date 1 
 
* *,F FP k  maximize firm profits:  
  
2
2[ ( ) ]
2 2
F
F F F F L F F FPZ P X R Xk k Z                (8) 
Given * *( , )F FP k , the bank chooses * * *, ,B L Dk R R  to maximize  
  * 2[ ( ) ]
2
B B F L D L B B BZ P R R R k k Z             (9) 
         subject to: 
                                                                       *F D DP R                  (10)   
                                                                     * *( , )F F F F DP k       (11)    
2.  Date 0  
 
Given * * * * *( , , , , )F F B L DP k k R R ,  the bank chooses [0,1]BP   to maximize: 
 
                ( )B B B B BP Z C P           (12) 
            subject to                                  * * *( , , ) 0B B L Dk R R        (13)   
 
 ( * * * *, , ,F B F BZ Z q q ) solve 
          2 2(1 ) (1 )
2 2
B
F B
W WZ q q        (14)   
                         *(1 )F B BZ k Z         (15)    
                        
B F
F D
F
F
P P R q W
q
     (16)    
                         
B
F D
B
B
P R q W
q
        (17)    
 
As of the end of date 1, the firm maximizes expected profits (Equation (8)) by choice of FP  
and Fk . Given these choices, the bank chooses capitalization and rates , ,B L Dk R R to 
maximize expected date 1 profits (Equation (9)), subject to depositors’ participation 
constraints (Equations (10)), and firm’s participation constraints (Equations (11)), which 
states that the bank cannot grant a return to the firm lower than what the firm could obtain by 
borrowing directly from investors. At date 0, given * * * * *( , , , , )F F B L DP k k R R , the bank chooses 
BP  to maximize date 0 expected profits (Equation (12)), subject to its participation constraint 
(Equation (13)). The last set of conditions defines the general equilibrium. Equation (14) is 
the equilibrium in the deposit market: bank’s demand for funds equals total funds supplied by 
depositors. Equation (15) is the equilibrium in the loan market: the supply of bank funds 
equals the firm’s demand for funds.  Finally, Equations (16) and (17) determine the 
equilibrium “specialization” choices of agents, that is, the proportions of agents becoming 
depositors, bankers and entrepreneurs.  
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In this set-up, total expected output net of effort costs (surplus) is constructed as follows. 
Total output of the investment in the technology in the good state is 
(1 ) (1 )(1 )F F F B BX k Z X k k Z    , with firm’s effort employed in project choice given by 
2
(1 )
2
F
B BP k Z  , and effort spent in firm’s capital given by 
2
(1 )
2
F
B Bk k Z  . The bank 
chooses capital after having chosen BP , but before the realization of the firm technology, 
incurring an effort cost 
2
2
B
Bk Z . Since firm investment is successful with probability FP , 
expected output (at date 1) net of all the effort costs above is: 
 
2 2 2
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
2 2 2
F F B
F F B B B BP k kP X k k k k Z             (18) 
 
Considering bank’s choice of BP , we arrive at the following definition: 
 
Definition 4. (Surplus)  Given an equilibrium indexed by ( , )D F  , the expected total 
output net of effort costs is:  
 
2 2 2
( , )
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )
2 2 2
D F
F F B
B F F B B B B B
Y
P k kP P X k k k k Z C P
 
  

          
      (19) 
The characterization of the equilibrium values of firm risk, firm capitalization, bank 
capitalization, as well as loan and deposit rates, are summarized by the following  
 
Proposition 5.  Let 
2
24( )
X
X
   . 
               
a) Firm risk *FP , firm capital *Fk , and bank capital *Bk are given by: 
 
 
 
PF *  ( X  R
L )
  X 2 ;     
* *F F Xk P  ;  
*
2
( )L LB X R Rk
X
  .   
 
      b) The equilibrium loan rate LR  and the deposit rate DR  are:  
      
2
L XR    ;  
2
2D D XR
X
 
                    if F D        
                              
22( )( , ) ( )L F D F D XR X     
   ;   
     
2
( , )
2
D
D F D
F D
XR     
              if  
F D       
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According to part (a) of Proposition 5, firm risk-taking increases and capital declines with a 
higher loan rate. By contrast, bank capitalization is a strictly concave function of the loan 
rate, which can be easily explained as follows. Replacing the firm optimal choice of FP  into 
date 1 bank profits (Equation (9)), the bank chooses the value of Bk  maximizes 
2
2
( )[ ( ) ]
2
L
L D L B B BX R R R R k k Z
X
 

    . As the loan rate increases, the bank obtains a high 
return in the good state on its’ own funds, but at the cost of a lower probability of getting 
repaid. It turns out that charging 
2
L XR   maximizes date 1 bank profits if the firm 
participation constraint (15) is not binding. When the constraint (15) is binding, however, the 
term  2
( )L LX R R
X



 —which represent the marginal revenue accruing from capital 
investment—is strictly decreasing in the loan rate for all 
2
L XR  . Therefore, it is optimal for 
the bank to choose lower levels of capital as the loan rate is increasing. 
 
According to part (b) of Proposition 5, loan and deposit rates differ depending on whether the 
firm participation constraint turns out to be binding. Constraint (11) is not binding 
when F D    . In this case, the bank extracts the maximum surplus in the loan market. 
By contrast, when the firm participation constraint (11) is binding ( F D    ), the degree 
of competition in both deposit and loan markets affect loan and deposit rates simultaneously.  
 
Interestingly, for a given level of competition in the deposit market D , an increase in 
competition in the loan market F  corresponding to a move from the region where 
F D     to the region where F D     results in a downward jump in both the 
lending and deposit rates. The lending rate declines, since the binding participation constraint 
of the firm forces the bank to lower the lending rate. But the bank can also pay a lower 
deposit rate, since depositors take into account the decline in the firm’s probability of default 
as the lending rate declines, and require a lower “risk premium”.  
 
These results indicate the existence of “low” and “high” relative loan market competition 
regimes. In the “low” regime ( F D    ), changes in deposit market competition do not 
affect lending rates and vice versa. In the “high” regime ( F D    ), changes in 
competition in both lending and deposit markets affect loan and deposit rates simultaneously. 
This implies that   is the threshold level below or above which the comparative statics 
results for firm risk, firm capitalization and bank capitalization differ, as shown in the 
following proposition.  
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Proposition 6  
a) 0F F BP K K      ,  ,F D   ,  for all ( , )F D   such that 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     ; 
b) F 0FP   0FFK  ; 0FBK   , and 0DFP   0DFK  ; 0DBK  for all ( , )F D   such that 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     . 
 
Proposition 6 says that when loan market competition (relative to deposit market 
competition) is “low” ( F D    ), risk and capital of firms, and capital of banks are 
constant, since the bank extracts the maximum rent on the loan market by charging the loan 
rate that maximizes its profits. The firm responds by choosing constant levels of project risk 
and capitalization. By contrast, when loan market competition is relatively “high” 
( F D    ), an increase in loan market competition, given deposit market competition, 
prompts firms to reduce risk and increase capital, while banks respond by decreasing   
capital. Conversely, an increase in deposit market competition, given loan market 
competition, produces the opposite results: firms increase risk and reduce capital, while 
banks increase capital. Note that in this case firm risk is affected directly by changes in 
deposit market competition, and in all cases, capital of firms and banks move in opposite 
directions.  
 
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we solve the bank problem with respect 
to BP (Equations (12) and (13)) considering both the (CR) and (IR) cases. Given the supply of 
funds BZ , the bank chooses BP  to maximize 2
2
B B B B BP Z P Z    under (CR), and 
2
2
B B B BP Z P   under (IR). The solutions are respectively:: 
  1min{ ,1}B BP               (22)  if  (CR) 
1min{ ,1}B B BP Z          (23)  if  (IR)  
 
The complete characterization of equilibriums is summarized by the following  
 
Proposition 7.  The equilibrium four-tuple * * * *( , , , )B F F BZ Z q q satisfies 
* * *(1 )F B BZ k Z  and: 
 
a. Under (CR):        
*
1
4
4 (2 (1 ) )
F D
B
F D B F B B
P RZ W
P R k         ;      
1
*
1
4 (1 )
4 (2 (1 ) )
B F B
F F D B F B B
kq
P R k
  
   


    ; 
1 2
*
1
2
4 (2 (1 ) )
B
B F D B F B Bq P R k
 
   

    .  
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b. Under (IR): 
2
* 4
2
B B B ACZ
A
    
with                 1 (2 (1 ) )B F B BA k      ;  4 F DB P R  ;  4 F DC P R W   ; 
 
1
*
1
4 (1 )
4 (2 (1 ) )
B B F B
F F D B B F B B
Z kq
P R Z k
  
   


    ; 
1 2
*
1
2
4 (2 (1 ) )
B B
B F D B B F B B
Zq
P R Z k
 
   

    . 
 
 
We focus on the impact of changes of bank competition in both markets. In this case, 
defining perfect competition requires specifying how the surplus that is not accruing to the 
bank is distributed among the firm and depositors. We assume that the surplus is distributed 
so that the firm and depositors get the same return. Therefore, we set F D D    , and let 
D  . Accordingly, “perfect competition” in both markets is the equilibrium 
corresponding to the value of  , denoted by max ( )B  , that satisfies the bank participation 
constraint (13) at equality. Thus, max[0, ( )]B    indexes the degree of competition in both 
the loan and deposit markets. Clearly, max ( )B   is strictly decreasing in B , as the surplus 
that can be appropriated by depositors and the firms is bounded above by the requirement to 
cover the bank’s (fixed) costs of the intermediation technology. 
 
Despite the complicated appearance of the expressions of the four-tuple * * * *( , , , )B F F BZ Z q q  in 
Proposition 7, equilibriums can be easily computed. We report results for two polar 
representative configurations of parameters related to the fixed costs and efficiency of the 
intermediation technology under both the (CR) and (IR) assumptions. These two 
configurations are denoted by 1 1( , )
B   and 2 2( , )B  , with 1 2   and 1 2B B  . The first 
configuration differs from the second because it represents a relatively more efficient, but 
more costly, intermediation technology. 
 
We are primarily interested in assessing how bank risk ( )  and surplus ( )Y   vary with 
competition. Recall that 1 2
( )( ) min{ ,1}
L
B X R
X
   
     under (CR), and 
1
2
( )( ) min{ ,1}
L
B B X RZ
X
   
     under (IR). Therefore, how ( )  varies with   depends 
on whether BP  is constant or decreasing, and when decreasing, whether the decline in BP  is, 
or is not, offset by an increase in FP . One effect would dominate the other depending on 
whether a decline in unit profits B , prompting the bank to choose a lower BP , is offset by a 
decline in firm risk FP .  With regards to welfare, the impact of changes in   will depend 
primarily on ( ) , on the evolution of aggregate funding BZ , and on the combination of 
firm and capital choices and associated effort costs. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the case of an economy where the bank uses a relatively more efficient 
intermediation technology. As competition increases, bank risk declines under both the (CR) 
and (IR) assumptions, since ( )  increases. Note the jump in ( )  at a given  , resulting 
from the switch from low to high relative loan market competition discussed previously. 
Furthermore, under both the (CR) and (IR) assumptions, perfect competition is optimal, 
achieving the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Finally, except for the discontinuity given by 
the jump in rates identified by Proposition 5, an increase in competition leads to an increase 
in the supply of funds to the bank *BZ and the firm *FZ . It is worthwhile to stress an 
interesting result regarding the interplay between bank capitalization, firm capitalization and 
bank risk. When competition increases from not too low levels, the firm increases capital, 
since lower loan rates increase the profitability of investing internally generated funds. By 
contrast, the bank capital declines, since the return to capital investment is reduced by a 
decline in loan rates. However, the decline in bank capital does not necessarily imply that 
bank risk increases.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the case where the bank intermediation technology is relatively 
inefficient. Under (CR), BP declines while FP  remains constant when competition in the 
loan market, relative to that in the deposit market, is “low”. As competition rises and the 
threshold   is reached, ( )  jumps up owing to the jump up of FP , but then it starts to 
decline again, as BP declines at a rate higher than the rate of increase of FP . As a result, the 
highest welfare is attained for “intermediate” values of  . Under (IR) we obtain essentially 
the same results. Therefore, imperfect competition is optimal, corresponding to an 
“intermediate” level of bank risk.  
 
Summing up, when the intermediation technology is relatively efficient, perfect competition 
is optimal and supports the lowest level of bank risk. Conversely, when the intermediation 
technology is relatively inefficient, a level of competition lower than perfect competition is 
optimal. These results are independent of whether the intermediation technology exhibits 
constant or increasing returns to scale.   
 
VII.   CONCLUSIONS  
We studied versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard in which the 
bank’s intermediation technology exhibits either constant or increasing returns to scale. In 
the basic version of the model under constant returns of the intermediation technology we 
showed that as deposit market competition increases, bank risk increases,  capitalization 
declines, and “intermediate” degreed of deposit market competition and bank risk are 
best..The result that the lowest attainable level of bank risk is not optimal echoes Allen and 
Gale’s (2004b) result that a positive degree of financial ”instability” can be a necessary 
condition for optimality. Yet, the efficiency of the intermediation technology matters. If this 
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, then the implications of this model for bank 
risk, capitalization and welfare are totally reversed: as competition increases, bank risk 
declines, capitalization increases, perfect deposit market competition and the lowest 
attainable level of bank risk are optimal. 
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Subsequently, we studied the more realistic version of the model where there is competition 
in both lending and deposit markets and bank risk is determined jointly by the bank and the 
firm.  The key results of the extended model pertain to the role of the efficiency of the 
intermediation technology in relationship to the level of competition in both lending and 
deposit markets. We showed that independently of whether the intermediation technology 
exhibits constant or increasing returns, perfect competition and the lowest attainable level of 
bank risk are optimal if the bank intermediation technology is relatively efficient. When such 
technology is relatively inefficient, however, perfect competition is suboptimal, and 
intermediates levels of competition and bank risk are best.  
 
The theoretical results or our study are empirically relevant. Several studies present evidence 
consistent with a positive relationship between bank competition and financial stability. 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find that branch deregulation resulted in a sharp decrease in 
loan losses. Restrictions on banks’ entry and activity have been found to be negatively 
associated with some measures of bank stability by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), Beck 
(2006a and 2006b), and Schaeck et al. (2009). Furthermore, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) 
and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find that banks with market power erect an important 
financial barrier to entry to the detriment of the entrepreneurial sector of the economy, 
leading to long-term declines in a country’s growth prospect. Lastly, Corbae and D’Erasmo 
(2011) present a detailed quantitative study of the U.S. banking industry based on a dynamic 
calibrated version of Boyd and De Nicolo’ (2005) model, finding evidence of a positive 
association between competition and financial stability. It is apparent that these results are 
consistent with the predictions of the basic model with increasing returns, and those of the 
extended model in which banks use relatively efficient intermediation technologies.  
 
Under a policy viewpoint, we believe that our results provide an important insight with 
regard to the question of whether supporting bank profits with some rents—or, in a dynamic 
context, supporting banks’ charter values—is a desirable public policy option. A substantial 
portion of the literature and the policy debate maintains that preserving bank profitability 
through rents enhancing bank profitability—or  banks’ charter values—may be desirable, as 
it induces banks to take on less risk. As we have shown, however, this argument ignores how 
these rents are generated, or how they may be eventually used once granted. 
 
Our results suggest that supporting bank profitability (or charter values) with rents that are 
independent of bank’s actions aimed at improving efficiency may be unwarranted.  If rents 
accrue independently of banks’ efforts to adopt more efficient intermediation technologies 
and, more generally, to provide better intermediation services, then rents are suboptimal and 
do not guarantee banking system stability. In this light, competitive pressures may be an 
effective incentive for banks to adopt more efficient intermediation technologies. In a 
competitive environment, rents would need to be earned by investing in technologies that 
provide banks a comparative advantage in providing intermediation services, rather than been 
derived from some market power enjoyed “freely”. 
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Figure 1. Bank Risk and Welfare (Relatively Efficient Intermediation Technology) 
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Parameters:  0.1  , 0.03B  , 1.5X  ,  1W  , 4  , 1   
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Figure 2. Bank Risk and Welfare (Relatively Inefficient Intermediation Technology) 
 
Panel A. CR Intermediation technology 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
ρ
Ρ(ρ)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
ρ
Y(ρ)
0
0.5
1
1.5
ρ
Z(B) Z(F)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
ρ
q(B) q(F)
 
 
Panel B. IR Intermediation technology 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
ρ
Ρ(ρ)
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
ρ
Y(ρ)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
ρ
Z(B) Z(F)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ
q(F) q(B)
 
Parameters:  1  , 0.01B  , 1.5X  ,  1W  , 4  , 1   
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APPENDIX 
 
Proposition 1  
c) Under  (CR),  
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X RP
X


      
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X R Xk
X

 
  ;  
2
*
2
4 ( )( ) (1 1 )
2
X XR
X
  
     if * 1P  ,  *R     if * 1P    
 
d) Under (IR), 
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X R ZP
X Z


   ) ,  
*
*
2
( )min{ ,1}X R Z Xk
X Z

 
  . 
 
2
*
2
4 ( / )( , ) (1 1 )
2
X Z XR Z
X
  
    if * 1P  , *R     if * 1P     
 
Proof:  
 
a)  * * *( , , )P k R  maximizes: 
 
B  [P( X  R  Xk)  
2
k 2 ]Z  
2
P2Z  (A.1) 
subject to                                                 *P R          (A.2) 
The optimality conditions with respect to * *( , )P k  are: 
 
P*  min{( X  R)  X 2 ,1} and 
* * Xk P       
Let * 1P  .  Substituting (6) and (7) into (A.1), bank profits are: 
 
2
( ) ( )
2
B X R X R Z
X


            (A.3) 
 
Since bank profits (A.3) are strictly decreasing in R, the depositor participation constraint 
(A.2) is satisfied at equality: 
2
( )X R R
X
 
     (A.4) 
 
The right hand side of equation (A.4) is a strictly concave function of R. Thus, the optimal 
value of R for the bank is the minimum value that satisfies the quadratic equation: 
 
2 2( ) 0R XR X          (A.5) 
Solving (A.5) yields: 
 
2 2 2
*
2
( ) 4 ( ) 4 ( )(1 1 )
2 2
X X X X XR
X
      
 
       (A.6) 
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If * 1P  , then (A.2) implies *R  . 
 
b) * * *( , , )P k R  maximizes: 
 
B  [P( X  R  Xk)  
2
k 2 ]Z  
2
P2  (A.7) 
subject to                                                         *P R          (A.8) 
 
The optimality conditions with respect to * *( , )P k  are: 
 
P*  min{( X  R)Z  X 2Z ,1}  and 
* * Xk P  . 
 
Let * 1P  .  Substituting * *( , )P k   into (A.7), bank profits are: 
2
( ) ( )
2
B X R Z X R Z
X Z


            (A.9) 
 
Since bank profits (A.7) are strictly decreasing in R, the depositor participation constraint 
(A.4) is satisfied at equality: 
2
( )X R Z R
X Z
 
        (A.10) 
 
The right hand side of equation (A.10) is a strictly concave function of R. Thus, the optimal 
value of R for the bank is the minimum value that satisfies the quadratic equation: 
 
2 2( / ) 0R XR Z X          (A.11) 
 
Solving (A.11) yields: 
2
2 2
2
1 4 ( / )( , ) ( ( ) 4 ( / ) (1 1 )
2 2
X Z XR Z X X Z X
X
      
        
If * 1P  , then (A.2) implies *R  .                                               QED 
 
Proposition 2   Under both (CR) and (IR), an equilibrium exists for all max(0, ]  . The 
equilibrium functions * * * * *{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}P k R Z q     are continuous and differentiable 
on   (0,max ) . 
 
Proof 
 
a. (CR).  
Using the expressions of bank risk, capitalization and the deposit rate derived in 
Proposition 1, the equilibrium conditions (3) and (4) become:  
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*
* * *( )
2
P X R Z P R qW
q
    (A.12) 
22 (1 )Z q W       (A.13) 
Solving (A.2) and (A.13), we obtain: 
 
* ( )( )
3 ( )
X Rq
X R
 
   (A.14)  
* 2 ( )( )
3 ( )
R WZ
X R
      (A.15) 
 
(A.14) and (A.15) imply that a) *( ) (0,1]q   , and b) *( )q   and *( )Z   are continuous and 
differentiable on max[0, ]  . At max , max( ) / 2R X  . Therefore:  
 
* max 2( )
5
WZ    (A.16) 
 * max 1( )
5
q     (A.17) 
 
b. (IR) 
          Rearranging (3) and (4), we get 
2
1( ) ( 1)2 ( , )
Z Xq Z q
W R Z      (A.18) 
2
2( ) 1q Z Z
W
       (A.19) 
Z  is an equilibrium when 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) 0.Q Z q Z q Z    Observe that 1 2(0) (0) (0) 0Q q q   , 
whereas  1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) 02 2 2 2 ( , )
2
W W W Z XQ q q WW R 
       , since ( , ) 0
2
WR   . 
Moreover, ( ) 0Q Z  . Therefore, there exists a unique value of Z  that satisfies ( ) 0.Q Z   for 
any given  . Since (.)Q  is continuous and differentiable in  , there exists a unique value of 
Z  that satisfies ( ) 0Q Z   for every  . The implicit equilibrium functions  Z  and q  are also 
continuous and differentiable in  .                                                                                 QED 
 
 
Proposition 3.  
a) Under (CR),  * *0; 0P k   ; * 0q  and * 0Z  . 
b) Under (IR),  * *0; 0P k   ; * 0q  and * 0Z  . 
Proof.  
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a) By Proposition 1, 
*
*
2
( ( ))X RP
X
 

  , and 
* * Xk P  .  Clearly, 
* 0P  , hence 
* 0k  , since . * 0R  .   By (A.11), * ( )( ) 3 ( )
X Rq
X R
 
  , and  
* 0q  . By 
Proposition 2, * * *2
2 0
(3 )R
WXZ Z R R
R X  
       
 
b) By Proposition 2, *( )Z   and *( )q  are continuous and differentiable functions.  
The equilibrium conditions (3) and (4) can be written as: 
 
* * * * * * 2( ( ( ), )) ( ) 2 ( ( ), ) ( ) 0X R Z Z R Z q W          (A.20) 
* * 22 ( ) (1 ( ) )Z q W    (A.18) 
 
Differentiating (A.17) and (A.18) with respect to  , we get  
 
* 2 * * * * *2( ( 2 )) 4 ( 2 )ZX R R Z q W Z Rq Wq R Z Wq                  (A.21) 
 
* * *2 2 0Z Wq q             (A.22) 
 
Plugging (A.22) in (A.21) and rearranging, we obtain:  
 
* *2
*
* *2
( 2 )
( 3 ( 2 ))Z
R Z q W
Z
X R R Z q W


              (A.23) 
 
*
*
*
Z
q
Wq

             (A.24) 
 
From Proposition 1, differentiating *R  with respect to Z  and   we obtain:  
 
2 2
* 1/2
2 2
2 2
* 1/2
2 2
4 ( / ) 4 /(1 ) 0
4
4 ( / ) 4( / )(1 ) 0
4
Z
X Z X ZR
X X
X Z X Z XR
X X
  
 
  
 


   
   
(A.25) 
  
By (A.25) * *2( 2 ) 0R Z q W    and * *23 ( 2 ) 0ZX R R Z q W    . Hence, 0Z  , and by 
(A.24), 0q  . The derivative of P  ( X  R(Z ,))Z  X 2Z  with respect to   is:  
2 2
2 2 [[( ) ( ) ]( ) ( ) ]( ) Z
P X R Z R Z R Z X Z X R ZX Z
X Z    
           (A.26) 
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Using (A.25) and rearranging, the term ( ( ), ) Z
dR Z R Z R
d  
 
    is: 
2
2 2
( 2 ) ( 3 )
( 3 ( 2 )) 3 ( 2 )Z Z Z Z
R Z q W R X R
R Z R R R Z
X R R Z q W X R R Z q W
 
   
           (A.27) 
 
The last expression in (A.27) derives from (A.23). Substituting (A.27) in (A.26), we get: 
 
2 2
2 2
2
2 2 2
[[( ) ]( ) ( ) ]
( )
( )( )
[ ]
( ) ( )
P X R Z Z Z X Z X R ZX Z
X Z
Z X R X Z Z
X Z X Z X R
   

 
  
 
      
    
(A.28) 
Note that 2 1( )X Z

   for any 0Z  .  The highest value of the term 
Z
X R  obtains when 
max 2( )
5
Z Z W   and max( )
2
XR R   . Thus,  max 4( ) 1
5
Z W
X R X
  , since X W .  
Thus: 
2
2 2 2
2
2 2
( )( )
[ ]
( ) ( )
( )( ) 4[1 ] 0.
( ) 5
Z X R X Z ZP
X Z X Z X R
Z X R X Z W
X Z X



  
 
 

     
   
(A.29) 
Moreover, * * 0Xk P    .                                                                                    QED 
 
Proposition 4.   
c) Under (CR), there exists a value maxˆ (0, )  such that ˆ( ) ( )Y Y   for all 
max[0, ]  . 
d) Under (IR), max( ) ( )Y Y   for all max(0, ]  . 
 
Proof:    
a) Replacing  * * Xk P   in (5), we obtain 
*2 *2
* * * * * * * 2 *21( ( )) ( )
2 2 2
P kY R Z P X P Xk Z P X X P  
              
 (A.30) 
 
Differentiating (A.30) with respect to  , we get: 
 
* * *
* * * * 2 *2 * * 2 *1 1[ ( ) ( ) ]
2R R R
Y Y R R Z P X X P Z P X X P     
                  (A.31) 
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Plugging 
*
*
2
( )X RP
X


  , *
*
2R
P
X

   , 
*
*
*
2
3
R WZ
X R
   and *
*
* 2
2
(3 )R
WXZ
R X
   in (A.31), 
and rearranging, we obtain: 
 
* *
* * 2 *
* * * * 2
2 2 2
* * * *2
2 * *
( ) 1 ( ( )) 1 ( )[ ( ( ) ]
2
2 [ ( ) ]
( )(3 ) (3 ) 2
R R
X R X R X RY R Z X Z P X X
X X X
W X XR X R R R
X R X R X
 

      


                  
        
 
 
Evaluating Y  with respect to   0  ( *(0) 0R  ) we get: 
* *
2
2( 0) [ ] 0
( ) 2
W XY R R X
X X 


        (A.32), 
 
Evaluating Y  with respect to
max   ( * max( )
2
XR   ), we get: 
* * 2
2
2 3
* *
2 2
2 2( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
2 ( )(3( / 2) ) (3 2 ) 2 2
2 1 4[ ] ( ) 0
( )(3( / 2) ) (3 2 ) 4 5 ( )
X W X X XY R R X
X X X X X
WX X WXR R
X X X X X X X
 
 


 
 
     
      
 (A.33) 
 
Thus, neither 0  nor max  are maximums of ( )Y  . Since ( )Y  is a continuous 
function defined on the compact set max[0, ] , it has a maximum and a minimum. Therefore, 
there exists a value maxˆ (0, )  such that ˆ( ) ( )Y Y   for all max(0, )  .      
 
b) Using * * Xk P   and 
2
*
( )X R ZX Z
P
   , the expected output net of effort 
costs evaluated at an equilibrium indexed by   is: 
*2 *2
* * * * *
* * * * * * * * *
( ( ))
2 2
1 1( ) ( )
2 2
k PY R Z P X P Xk
P Z X XZ R Z P XZ R Z
         
   
(A.34) 
By Proposition 1, * 0Z  ; * 0P  . Therefore, *( ( ))Y R   is strictly increasing in  . QED 
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Proposition 5.  Let 
2
24( )
X
X
   . 
               
a) Firm risk *FP , firm capital *Fk , and bank capital *Bk are given by: 
 
 
 
PF *  ( X  R
L )
  X 2 ;     
* *F F Xk P  ;  
*
2
( )L LB X R Rk
X
  .   
 
            b) The equilibrium loan rate LR  and the deposit rate DR  are:  
      
2
L XR    ;  
2
2D D XR
X
 
                    if F D        
                              
22( )( , ) ( )L F D F D XR X     
   ;   
     
2
( , )
2
D
D F D
F D
XR     
              if  
F D       
 
Proof:  
 
a) * *( , )F FP k  maximize the firm expected profits (8). The first order conditions are: 
 
*
2
( )min{ ,1}
L
F X RP
X


  (A.35);  
* *F F Xk P     (A.36) 
 
Under the maintained assumptions, * (0,1)FP  . Turning to the bank problem, given 
* *( , )F FP k , a bank chooses , ,B L Dk R R  to maximize (9), subject to (10) and (11). The first 
order condition for the optimal bank capital yields: 
*
2
( )L LB X R Rk
X
        (A.37)   
b) Substituting (A.37) in the profit function (9) yields: 
 
2 2
2 2 2
2
2
2 2
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ]
( ) 2 ( )
( )[( )( ) ]
2( )
L L L
B B L D L L B
L
L L D L B
X R X R X RZ R R R R Z
X X X
X RX R R R R Z
X X
    

 
        
   
(A.38) 
 
Bank profits (A.38) are strictly decreasing in the deposit rate for any value of the loan rate. 
Therefore, the deposit participation constraint (10) is satisfied at equality, which implies:   
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2
( )
D D
L
XR
X R
 
         (A.39) 
Substituting (A.39) in (A.38) and using 2
( )LF X RP
X


  , we get: 
 
2 2
2
2 2
( )[( )( ) ]
( ) 2( )
1[ ]
2
F L
B B L L D L B
L
F L F D B
X X RZ X R R R Z
X X R X
P R P Z
    

       
 
(A.40) 
 
Let ( )L Ly X R R  . Choosing the loan rate that maximizes (A.40) is equivalent to choosing 
( )L Ly X R R   that maximizes: 
2
2 2[ ( ) ]2 ( )
B B D ByZ y Z
X X
        (A.41) 
 
Both ( )L Ly X R R  and 2 2[( ) ]L Ly X R R   are maximized at 
2
L XR  , which results in  
2 / 4y X . Therefore, the bank would choose to charge 
2
L XR   if (11) is not binding. 
  
Firm profits at an optimum are: 
2 2 2
* *
2
2
2
( , ) [ (( ) ) ]
2 2
[( )] ( )[ ] [ ]
2( ) 2
F F F
F F F F L F
L L
F F F
P X P P XP k P X R X Z
X R X RZ P Z
X
 
 


      
 
           (A.42) 
 
Define profit per unit of investment as: 
 
2
2
[( )] ( )
2( ) 2
L L
F FX R X RP
X
 
       (A.43) 
 
If 
2
L XR  , then (11) is not binding if: 
2 2
2 2
[( / 2)]
2( ) 4( )
F F DX X X
X X
    
       (A.44) 
Clearly, for all F  such that 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     ,  (11) is binding. Since the loan rate 
satisfies 
2
2
[( )]
2( )
L
F DX R
X
  
   , and the deposit rate satisfies  (A.39), both imply 
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2
2
2( )( , ) ( )
( , )
2
L F D F D
D
D F D
F D
XR X
XR
    
    
  
 
              (A.45). 
           QED 
 
 
Proposition 6  
a) 0F F BP K K      ,  ,F D   ,  for all ( , )F D   such that 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     ; 
b) F 0FP   0FFK  ; 0FBK   , and F 0FP   0DFK  ; 0DBK  for all ( , )F D   such that 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     . 
 
Proof:  
a) If 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     , by Proposition 3, 2
L XR   . Substituting this loan rate in 
PF , kF , k B  , we obtain:  
22( )
F XP
X

   ; 
2
22 ( )
F Xk
X    ;  
2
24 ( )
B Xk
X    (A.46) 
 
As the above expressions do not depend on either F or D , we have 0F F BP K K     , 
,F D      for all  ( , )F D   such that 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     ; 
a) If 
2
24( )
F D X
X
     ,  by Proposition 3 , 
22( )( , ) ( )L F D F D XR X     
   , hence 0FLR   and 0DLR   
Differentiating 2
( ( , ))L F DF X RP
X
  

   and  2
( ( , ))L F DF X X Rk
X
 

   we get: 
2 0F F
F LP R
X 

    ; 2 0D D
F LP R
X 

   ;   (A.47) 
2 0F F
F LXk R
X      ; . 2 0D D
F LXk R
X       (A.48) 
 
 Bank capital is given by   2
( ( , )) ( , )L F D L F DB X R Rk
X
   

  , which implies. 
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2 2( 2 ( , )) 0; ( 2 ( , )) 0
F D
F D
L L
B L F D B L F D
R R
k X R k X R
X X
 
             
since ( , ) / 2L F DR X    and 0FLR   and 0DLR                                    QED 
 
 
 
Proposition 7.  The equilibrium four-tuple * * * *( , , , )B F F BZ Z q q satisfies 
* * *(1 )F B BZ k Z  and: 
 
a. Under (CR):        
*
1
4
4 (2 (1 ) )
F D
B
F D B F B B
P RZ W
P R k           ;      
1
*
1
4 (1 )
4 (2 (1 ) )
B F B
F F D B F B B
kq
P R k
  
   


    ; 
1 2
*
1
2
4 (2 (1 ) )
B
B F D B F B Bq P R k
 
   

    .  
 
b. Under (IR): 
2
* 4
2
B B B ACZ
A
    
With                 1 (2 (1 ) )B F B BA k      ;  4 F DB P R  ;  4 F DC P R W   ; 
1
2
1
4 (1 )
4 (2 (1 ) )
B B F B
F F D B B F B B
Z kq
P R Z k
  
   


    ; 
1 2
*
1
2
4 (2 (1 ) )
B B
B F D B B F B B
Zq
P R Z k
 
   

    . 
 
Proof:      
a) * * * *( , , , )F B F BZ Z q q   solve the system: 
 
          2 22 (2 )B F BZ W q q       (A.49)  
                         (1 )F B BZ k Z    (A.50)    
                        
B F F
F D
F
F
P Z P R q W
q
    (A.51)    
                         
2
B B B
F D
B
B
P Z P R q W
q
      (A.52)    
The system (A.49)-(A.52) is a linear in 2 2( , , , )B F F BZ Z q q , and can be solved by substitution. 
Plugging (A.55) in (A.56), we obtain: 
          2 22 (2 )B F BZ W q q       (A.53)  
                        2 (1 )
B F B B
F F D
P k Zq
P R W
    (A.54)    
                         2
2
B B B
B F D
P Zq
P R W
     (A.55)    
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Plugging (A.55) and (A.54) in (A.49), we get: 
4
4 (2 (1 ) )
F D
B
F D B F B B
P RZ W
P R P k                  (A.56) 
 
Plugging (A.56) in (A.55) and (A.54), we get: 
2 4 (1 )
4 (2 (1 ) )
B F B
F F D B F B B
P kq
P R P k

 
    ; 
2 2
4 (2 (1 ) )
B B
B F D B F B B
Pq
P R P k

     (A.57) 
 
b)  Since  P
B   1 BZ B ,  (14) implies 
 
1
1 2
4
4 (2 (1 ) )
(2 (1 ) ) 4 4 0
F D
B
F D B B F B B
B F B B B F D B F D
P RZ W
P R Z k
k Z P R Z P R W
   
   


   
    
(A.58) 
 
Therefore:  
 
Z B  B  B
2  4AC
2A
  (A.59) 
where:                  1 (2 (1 ) )B F B BA k      ;   4 F DB P R  ;   4 F DC P R W  . 
 
Accordingly, (1 )F B BZ k Z    and  
 
 
qF
2  4
1 BZ B F (1 k B )
4PF RD   1 BZ B (2 F (1 k B )   B ) ;qB
2  2
1 B2Z B
4PF RD   1 BZ B (2 F (1 k B )   B ) (A.60) 
 
                                                                                                                                QED 
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